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I. Foreword
1. 1st January 2016 marked the 30th anniversary of  Portugal’s accession to the 
European Economic Community (EEC), now the European Union (EU), together 
with Spain, following the signing of  the Treaty of  Accession, which took place on 
12th June 1985. It is a moment of  celebration and of  reflection on the past but, more 
importantly, on the future of  the EU. Looking onwards to the future of  the Union 
necessarily means discussing EU citizenship. EU citizenship, which is additional to 
national citizenship of  a Member State and affords a set of  rights, is at a crossroads, 
especially in terms of  its implementation by the Member States and its relation to 
fundamental rights, namely social rights, and the principle of  non-discrimination. 
There has been a recent change in the Court of  Justice of  the European Union’s 
(CJEU) case-law in this subject that could have profound consequences. 
II. Introduction: the construction of the EU citizenship by the 
CJEU
2. The concept of  citizenship of  the EU, which was a novel experiment1 
established by the Maastricht Treaty 1992, and recognized in the Treaty of  the EU 
(TEU) and the Treaty on the Functioning of  the EU (TFEU), as well as the rights 
and duties it entails, has evolved greatly, in response to the case-law of  the CJEU. 
2014, 2015 and 2016 have been no exception to the central role played by the 
CJEU in the development of  the legal status of  EU citizenship. To name just a few 
cases, one can mention the Delvigne case,2 on Member States’ legislation providing 
for the deprivation of  the right to vote in the case of  a criminal conviction in certain 
cases. There was also a string of  cases concerning the right of  residence in the 
EU for divorced spouses, namely when they are the care-taker of  minors who have 
EU citizenship. This was the issue in the Singh case,3  as it concerned the proposed 
retention of  the right of  residence of  a third-country national married to an EU 
citizen after the spouse’s departure from the host Member State, followed by divorce 
In the NA case,4 on the same question, with the difference in this case being that the 
third country national had custody of  children who were EU citizens, and the Rendón 
Marín case,5 which dealt with the right of  a third-country national with a criminal 
record to reside in a Member State of  a third-country national with a criminal record 
who is the parent having sole care of  two minor children, who are Union citizens. 
3. The evolution of  the notion of  Union citizenship in CJEU case-law was 
especially notable in the area of  the free movement and residence of  EU citizens and 
their access to social benefits. The Court’s case-law has been central for the guarantee 
of  an effective right to freedom of  movement of  citizens within the territory of  
the Member States, recognized in the TEU, as one of  the fundamental freedoms on 
which the Union is based, and to which the principle of  prohibition of  discrimination 
1 E. Gild, C. Gortázar Rotaeche and D. Kostakopoulou, The reconceptualization of  European Union 
citizenship (Leiden: M. Nijhoff, 2014) 1. 
2 Judgment Delvigne, of  6 October 2015, Case C-650/13. 
3 Judgment Singh, of  16 July 2015, Case C-218/14. 
4 Judgment  NA, of  30 June 2016, Case C-115/15. 
5 Judgment Rendón Marín, of  13 September 2016, Case C-165/14. 
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on grounds of  nationality (Article 18 TFEU)6 applies. According to Article 3(2) 
TEU; “The Union shall offer its citizens an area of  freedom, security and justice without internal 
frontiers, in which the free movement of  persons is ensured”. The right of  every citizen of  
the Union “to move and reside freely within the territory of  the Member States, subject to the 
limitations and conditions laid down in the Treaties and by the measures adopted to give them effect” 
is also recognized (Article 21 TFEU).7 The relation between freedom of  movement, 
freedom of  residence, and the prohibition of  discrimination is implemented by the 
Citizens’ Directive.8/9
In the Grzelczyk case, the Court established one of  the cornerstones of  the 
EU citizenship case-law: that; “Union citizenship is destined to be the fundamental status of  
nationals of  the Member States, enabling those who find themselves in the same situation to enjoy 
the same treatment in law irrespective of  their nationality, subject to such exceptions as are expressly 
provided for”.10
The CJEU recognized the direct effect of  the right of  residence of  Union 
citizens11 and has consistently extended the prohibition of  discrimination and the 
principle of  equality, while interpreting Articles 18, 20 and 21 TFEU, namely to EU 
citizens who reside lawfully in the Member State but are economically inactive.12 The 
Court was especially important in the building of  a notion of  EU citizenship which 
was not connected with the need to have an economic link to a certain Member 
State and which granted access to a wider range of  rights. The EU citizenship should 
make a difference and involves a break from merely economic categories, such as 
“worker”, which were predominant in the EEC.13
6 On the expansive interpretation by the Court of  the EU citizenship in relation to the principle 
of  equality, v., v.g., C. Barnard, “EU citizenship and the principle of  solidarity”, in Social welfare and 
EU law, ed. M. Dougan and E. Spaventa (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2005) 157-180; G. Davies, “The 
humiliation of  the state as a constitutional tactic”, in The Constitutional Integrity of  the European Union, 
ed. F. Amtenbrink and P.A.J. van den Berg (The Hague: Asser Press, 2010) 147; M. Dougan and E. 
Spaventa, “Wish you weren’t here...: new models of  social solidarity in the European Union”, in 
Social welfare and EU law, ed. M. Dougan and E. Spaventa (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2005) 181-218; 
S. Giubonni, “Free movement of  Persons and European solidarity”, European Law Journal, vol. 13, No. 3 
(2007) 360-379; C. O’Brien, “Real links, abstract rights and false alarms: the relationship between ECJ’s ‘real 
link’ case law and national solidarity”, European Law Review, vol. 33, No. 5 (2008) 643-665. 
7 J. Cunha Rodrigues, “Liberdade de Circulação e Permanência”, in Carta dos Direitos Fundamentais da 
União Europeia Comentada, ed. Alessandra Silveira and Mariana Canotilho (Coimbra: Almedina, 2013) 
522-523. 
8 Directive 2004/38/EC of  the European Parliament and of  the Council of  29 April 2004 on 
the right of  citizens of  the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the 
territory of  the Member States amending Regulation (EEC) No 1612/68 and repealing Directives 
64/221/EEC, 68/360/EEC, 72/194/EEC, 73/148/EEC, 75/34/EEC, 75/35/EEC, 90/364/
EEC, 90/365/EEC and 93/96/EEC.
9 For a comprehensible analysis, v. E. Guild, S. Peers and J. Tomkin, The EU citizenship directive: a 
commentary (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014). 
10 Judgment Grzelczyk, of  20 September 2001, Case C-184/99, recital 31. 
11 V, v.g., Judgments Baumbast, of  17 September 2002, Case C-413/99, recital 84, and Trojani, of  7 
September 2004, Case C-456/02, recital 32. 
12 V, v.g., Judgment Martínez Sala, of  12 May 1998, Case C-85/96, recitals 61-62. 
13 V. v.g.,  E. Spaventa, “From Gebhard to Carpenter: Towards a (non-)economic European constitution”, 
Common Market Law Review, vol. 41, No. 3 (2004) 743–773; N. Nic Shuibhne, “The Resilience of  
EU Market Citizenship”, Common Market Law Review, vol 47, No. 6 (2010) 1597-1628, 1605-1609; 
S. Kadelbach, “Union citizenship”, in Principles of  European Constitutional Law, ed. von Bogdandy and 
Bast, 2nd ed., (Oxford: Hart, 2009) 443-478, 445-448; C. O’Brien, “I trade, therefore I am: legal personhood 
in the European Union”, Common Market Law Review, vol. 50 (2013) 1643-1684. 
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III. EU citizenship and the access to social assistance granted to 
non-national EU citizens
4. The freedom of  movement has close links with the non-national EU citizens’ 
access to social rights, and specifically to social benefits, in the host State and it was 
up to the CJEU to largely develop the legal framework and the principles applicable. 
The Court developed an approach which was centred on the individual at issue and its 
subjective case and established that the right of  residence and of  establishment and the 
equal treatment principle should not be precluded by lack of  resources. For instance, 
the principle of  equality is applicable to the rights of  students, who are exercising their 
right of  residence, to maintenance aid, despite the exception established in Article 24 
(2) of  the Citizens’ Directive.14
The prohibition of  discrimination on ground of  nationality and the establishment 
of  EU citizenship were seen by the CJEU as precluding the entitlement to a non-
contributory social benefit from being made conditional to non-national legally residing 
EU citizens being considered as workers when no such conditions would apply to 
nationals of  the Member State. In Judgments such as Martínez Sala, Grzelczyk, Trojani, or 
Bidar, for instance, the CJEU developed case-law which incrementally broadened non-
national EU citizens’ rights to claim social benefits while narrowing Member States’ 
scope to regulate or restrict their access to national welfare systems, notably in the case 
of  non-contributory benefits. The Court recognized and accepted that this involved 
the need for a certain degree of  financial solidarity between Member States.15 
However, the Court accepted that in certain cases, it was legitimate for a Member 
State to grant such a benefit only after it has been possible to establish a “real link” 
between the job-seeker and the labour market of  that State,16 or a “certain degree of  
integration into the society of  the host State” was demonstrated.17 Finally, in any case, the 
Court recognized that the applicant should not become “an unreasonable burden” on the 
public finances of  the Member State.18
  5. The rights of  freedom of  movement and of  residence of  EU citizens, as 
developed by the CJEU, are closely connected with the development of  EU integration. 
However, case-law was sometimes criticised, namely by some of  the Member States, for 
being too broad in recognizing the access to benefits while interpreting the Citizens’ 
Directive too extensively.19 There is a direct relation with the current debates on 
14 V, v.g., Judgments D’Hoop, of  11 July 2002, Case C-224/98, recitals 30-32; Bidar, of  15 March 
2005, Case C-209/03, recital 31. 
15 Judgment Grzelczyk, of  20 September 2001, Case C-184/99, recital 44; Bidar, of  15 March 2005, 
Case C-209/03, recital 56. 
16 V., v.g., Judgments Vatsouras, of  4 June 2009, Cases C-22/08 and C-23/08, recitals 38-39, and, 
Collins, of  23 March 2004, Case C-138/02, recitals 67-69. 
17 V., v.g., Judgments Bidar, of  15 March 2005, Case C-209/03, recital 57; Ioannidis, of  15 September 
2005, Case C-258/04, recital 30 et seq.; Förster, of  18 November 2008, Case C-158/07, recital 54; 
Gottwald, of  1 October 2009, Case C-103/08, recital 32 et seq. 
18 V., v.g., Judgments Grzelczyk, of  20 September 2001, Case C-184/99, recital 44; and Commission v 
Austria [reduced fares on public transport granted to students], of  4 October 2012, Case C-75/11, recital 60. 
19 V., v.g., N. Caicedo Camacho, “La Directiva 2004/38/CE y la jurisprudencia del TJCE sobre el 
disfrute de las prestaciones sociales: ¿freno al avance en materia social o adecuación a los intereses 
de los estados?”, Revista d’estudis autonòmics i federals, No. 19 (2014) 96-143; G. Davies, “The 
humiliation of  the state as a constitutional tactic”, in The Constitutional Integrity of  the European Union, 
ed. F. Amtenbrink and P.A.J. van den Berg (The Hague: Asser Press, 2010) 147-174; S. Giubonni, 
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access by non-nationals to social security in host States, characterized sometimes as 
‘welfare migration’20 or ‘social tourism’,21 where (at least some of) the Member States reject 
intrusions in their autonomy. The European Commission defends the freedom of  
movement of  persons.22 The broad interpretation could interfere with the Member 
States’ political choices or the national solidarity basis of  their welfare systems.23 The 
debate has grown in intensity because of  the perceived need to implement budget-cuts 
on national benefits during the global economic crisis.24
IV. The recent evolution in CJEU case-law on access to social 
assistance granted to non-national EU citizens
6. Against this background, a number of  recent CJEU judgments present a striking 
shift in relation to the previous case-law, clarifying the limits of  the right to access to 
social assistance granted to non-national Union citizens in host Member States under 
EU Law. 
In the Brey judgment,25 of  September 2013, the CJEU stated that the Citizen’s 
Directive “allows the host Member State to impose legitimate restrictions in connection with the grant 
of [social security] benefits to Union citizens who do not or no longer have worker status, so that 
“Free movement of  persons and European solidarity”, European Law Journal, vol. 13, No. 3 (2007) 360-
379; Idem, “A Certain Degree of  Solidarity? Free Movement of  Persons and Access to Social 
Protection in the Case Law of  the European Court of  Justice”, in Promoting Solidarity in the European 
Union, ed. M. Ross and Y. Borgmann-Prebil (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010)191-193; 
I. Lirola Delgado, “Derecho de residencia de los ciudadanos de la Unión y prestaciones sociales en tiempos de 
crisis”, Revista de Derecho Comunitario Europeo, vol. 18, No. 49 (2014) 761-762; F. Wollenschläger 
“A New Fundamental Freedom beyond Market Integration: Union Citizenship and its Dynamics for Shifting the 
Economic Paradigm of  European Integration”, European Law Journal, 17 (2011) 1-34. 
20 P. Larkin, “The Limits to European Social Citizenship in the United Kingdom”, Modern Law Review, 68 
(2005) 435-447, 440-442; S. Mantu and P. Minderhoud, “Exploring the limits of  social solidarity: welfare 
tourism and EU citizenship”, UNIO - EU Law Jounal, vol. 2, No. 2 (2016) 4-19. 
21 Term used by Advocate General Geelhoed, and described as “moving to a Member State with a 
more congenial social security environment” (v. Opinion of  Advocate General Geelhoed delivered on 19 
February 2004, Trojani, C-456/02, 18). 
22 For an overview, v. M. Morsa, “Les migrations internes à l’Union européenne sont-elles motivées par un accès 
à des prestations sociales Citoyenneté européenne, liberté de circulation et de séjour des inactifs et droits sociaux. La 
relation entre la coordination européenne et la directive 2004/38”, Journal des tribunaux du travail, No. 1190 
(2014) 245-246; H. Verschueren, “Free Movement or Benefit Tourism: The Unreasonable Burden of  Brey”, in 
European Journal of  Migration and Law, 16 (2014) 147-179. 
23 M. Dougan, “The constitutional dimension to the case law on Union citizenship”, European Law Review, 
31 (2006) 613-641, 623; A.J. Menéndez, “European Citizenship after Martinez Sala and Baumbast: 
Has European Law Become More Human but Less Social?”, in The Past and Future of  EU Law. The 
Classics of  EU Law Revisited on the 50th Anniversary of  the Rome Treaty, ed. M. Poiares Maduro and L. 
Azoulai (Oxford: Hart, 2010) 391-392. 
24 V. Editorial Comments, “The free movement of  persons in the European Union: Salvaging 
the dream while explaining the nightmare”, Common Market Law Review, vol. 51 (2014) 729-740; J. 
Shaw, “Between law and political truth? Member States preferences, EU free movement rules and 
national immigration law”, Conference paper, UACES 44th Annual Conference, Cork, 1-3 September 2014 
(available in  http://www.uaces.org); I. Lirola Delgado, “Derecho de residencia de los ciudadanos de 
la Unión y prestaciones sociales en tiempos de crisis”, 734-742. 
25 Judgment Brey, of  19 September 2013, Case C-140/12. Mr Brey and his wife were both German 
nationals with no other income or assets other than a low sum of  pension and benefit payments 
received in Germany. After moving to Austria in 2011, Mr Brey applied for a compensatory 
supplement. However, the Austrian authorities refused this because the aforementioned low 
amounts of  pension payments from Germany supposedly did not constitute sufficient resources to 
establish his lawful residence in Austria.
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those citizens do not become an unreasonable burden on the social assistance system of  that Member 
State”.26/27 This objective to avoid that situation where a citizen becomes an “unreasonable 
burden” was already stated in Recital 10 in the preamble to the Directive.28
However, the Court interpreted the Directive in light of  the Treaty and of  general 
principles of  EU law. The result was that “since the right to freedom of  movement is – as a 
fundamental principle of  EU law – the general rule, the conditions laid down in Article 7(1)(b) 
of  Directive 2004/38 must be construed narrowly (see, by analogy, Kamberaj, paragraph 86, and 
Chakroun, paragraph 43) and in compliance with the limits imposed by EU law and the principle of  
proportionality (see Baumbast and R, paragraph 91; Zhu and Chen, paragraph 32; and Commission 
v Belgium, paragraph 39)”. This meant that EU law precluded the automatic exclusion of  
an economically inactive citizen of  another Member State from receiving a particular 
social benefit because that exclusion does not enable the competent authorities of  the 
host Member State to “carry out – in accordance with the requirements under, inter alia, Articles 
7(1)(b) and 8(4) of  that directive and the principle of  proportionality – an overall assessment of  the 
specific burden which granting that benefit would place on the social assistance system as a whole by 
reference to the personal circumstances characterising the individual situation of  the person concerned 
would be”.29 
The Brey test is construed in such a way that the Member State’s authorities can 
only claim that a citizen is an unreasonable burden to their social security system after 
considering their own individual personal situation. 
7. Only a year later, in November 2014, the Dano case30 represents the beginning 
of  a different methodology of  analysis of  the relationship between the right to reside 
and the right of  access to social benefits.31 In the Dano decision, the CJEU made it clear 
that Member States may reject claims to social assistance by EU citizens who have no 
intention to work and cannot support themselves. It was followed by the Alimanovic 
case, which confirmed the new trend and gave the Court the opportunity to clarify the 
application of  this principle.
26 Judgment Brey, of  19 September 2013, Case C-140/12, recital 57. 
27 For an analysis of  the Brey case, v., v.g., B. Spiegel, “Anspruch auf  Leistungen der sozialen 
Sicherheit von nicht aktiven Personen – wer fürchtet sich vor ‘Sozialtourismus’? Neue EuGH 
Fälle: C-140/12, Brey, und C-333/13, Dano”, ERA Forum, 15, 2014, pp. 339–340; D. Thym, 
“Sozialleistungen für und Aufenthalt von nichterwerbstätigen Unionbürgern”, Neue Zeitschrift für Sozialrecht, 
23 (2014). 81–120; H. Verschueren, “Free Movement or Benefit Tourism: The Unreasonable Burden of  Brey”, 
European Journal of  Migration and Law, 16 (2014) 147-179; A.P. van der Mei, “Overview of  Recent 
Cases before the Court of  Justice of  the European Union (October-December 2014)”, European Journal of  
Social Security, vol. 17, No. 1 (2014) 102–122. 
28 Judgment Brey, of  19 September 2013, Case C-140/12, recital 54. It was already stated in the 
Judgment Ziolkowski and Szeja, of  21 December 2011, Cases C-424/10 and C-425/10, recital 40. 
29 Judgment Brey, of  19 September 2013, Case C-140/12, recital 77. 
30 Judgment Dano, of  11 November 2014, Case C 333/13. 
31 For an analysis of  the Dano case, v., v.g., D. Guimarães, “The Right of  Free Movement and the Access To 
Social Protection in the EU: The Economical Dimension. Notes on the Case Elisabeta Dano v Jobcenter Leipzig, 
C-333/13”, UNIO - EU Law Jounal, vol. 1, No. 1 (2015) 110-120; D. Thym, “The Elusive limits of  
solidarity: Residence rights of  and social benefits for economically inactive Union citizens”, Common Market 
Law Review, 52 (2015) 17-20; A.P. van der Mei, “Overview of  Recent Cases before the Court of  Justice of  
the European Union (January-June 2015)”, European Journal of  Social Security, vol. 17, No. 4 (2015) 
481–496; H. Verschueren, “Preventing ‘Benefit Tourism’ in the EU: A Narrow or Broad Interpretation of  the 
Possibilities offered by the ECJ in Dano?”, Common Market Law Review, 52 (2015) 363-364; and, very 
critically of  the CJEU’s new approach: N. Nic Shuibne, “Limits Rising, Duties Ascending: The Changing 
Legal Shape of  Union Citizenship”, Common Market Law Review, 52 (2015) 889-937. 
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At the beginning of  the reasoning of  the Dano decision, the Court repeats the 
Grzelczyk statement that; “the status of  citizen of  the Union is destined to be the fundamental 
status of  nationals of  the Member States”.32 However, the CJEU subsequently answered 
the questions by reference to the Citizens’ Directive and Regulation No 883/2004,33 as 
“more specific expressions” of  the prohibition of  discrimination on grounds of  nationality 
under Article 18 TFEU, and says that; “so far as concerns access to social benefits, such as those 
at issue in the main proceedings, a Union citizen can claim equal treatment with nationals of  the 
host Member State only if  his residence in the territory of  the host Member State complies with the 
conditions of  Directive 2004/38”.34/35 In doing so, the Court does a literal interpretation of  
the text of  the Directive without reference to the Treaties – especially to the provisions 
on EU citizenship and the freedom of  movement and of  residence.
Adopting this methodology allows the CJEU to state that “any unequal treatment 
between Union citizens who have made use of  their freedom of  movement and residence and nationals 
of  the host Member State with regard to the grant of  social benefits is an inevitable consequence of  
Directive 2004/38”36 without having to equate this statement with the general principles 
of  EU law and with the Treaties’ rules.
According to the Citizens’ Directive, the right of  residence for periods longer 
than three months is subject to the conditions set out in Article 7(1) which distinguishes 
between; (i) persons who are working and (ii) those who are not. The first group of  
citizens have the right of  residence in the host Member State without having to fulfil 
any other condition (Article 7(1)(a) of  Directive). Persons who are economically 
inactive are required by Article 7(1)(b) of  the Directive to meet the condition that they 
have sufficient resources of  their own. From these provisions the Court concludes that 
each; “Member State must therefore have the possibility, pursuant to Article 7 of  Directive 2004/38, 
of  refusing to grant social benefits to economically inactive Union citizens who exercise their right to 
freedom of  movement solely in order to obtain another Member State’s social assistance although they do 
not have sufficient resources to claim a right of  residence”.37
No reference to the individual situation of  Ms Dano was made other than that “in 
the main proceedings, according to the findings of  the referring court the applicants do not have sufficient 
resources and thus cannot claim a right of  residence in the host Member State”.38 This, in itself, 
signified a departure from the Brey test described supra.
One of  the questions was on the application of  the Charter of  Fundamental 
Rights to the case. The CJEU, however, stated that it did not have jurisdiction. Its 
reasoning was that since the conditions  creating the right to the benefits did not 
result, neither from Regulation No 883/2004 nor from Directive 2004/38 or other 
secondary EU legislation It was thus, for the legislature of  each Member State to lay 
down those conditions. According to the Court, while doing so, the Member States are 
32 Judgment Dano, of  11 November 2014, Case C 333/13, recital 58. 
33 Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 of  the European Parliament and of  the Council of  29 April 2004 
on the coordination of  social security systems. 
34 Judgment Dano, of  11 November 2014, Case C 333/13, recital 69. 
35 The Advocate General Wathelet also concluded that EU law did not preclude the national 
legislature from choosing to exclude nationals of  other Member States from entitlement to a special 
non-contributory cash benefit on the basis of  a general criterion, such as the reason for entering 
the territory of  the host Member State, but used the capability of  demonstrating the absence of  
a genuine link with that State, in order to prevent an unreasonable burden on its social assistance 
system (v. Advocate General Wathelet Opinion, delivered on 20 May 2014, Dano, C-333/13, 139).
36 Judgment Dano, of  11 November 2014, Case C 333/13, recital 77. 
37 Judgment Dano, of  11 November 2014, Case C 333/13, recital 78. 
38 Judgment Dano, of  11 November 2014, Case C 333/13, recital 81. 
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not implementing EU law for the effect of  triggering the application of  the Charter 
under its Article 51 (1).39  
8. In the Alimanovic case40 one year later, the Court used the Dano line of  reasoning, 
confirming that a new paradigm of  access of  non-national EU citizens to host State 
social benefits had emerged.41/42
The question before the CJEU was if  Member States could exclude nationals of  
other Member States who are job-seekers in the host Member State from entitlement 
to certain ‘special non-contributory cash benefits’ within the meaning of  Article 70(2) of  
Regulation No 883/2004, which also constitute ‘social assistance’ within the meaning 
of  Article 24(2) of  the Citizens’ Directive, although those benefits were granted to 
nationals of  the Member State concerned who are in the same situation.43 The Court 
reiterated the Dano assessment that “a Union citizen can claim equal treatment with nationals 
of  the host Member State under Article 24(1) of  Directive 2004/38 only if  his residence in the 
39 Judgment Dano, of  11 November 2014, Case C-333/13, recitals 87-92. 
40 Judgment Alimanovic, of  15 September 2015, Case C-67/14. The case concerns the access of  Nazifa 
Alimanovic and her three German born children, all possessing the Swedish nationality, to German 
social welfare benefits. These welfare benefits include Arbeitslosengeld II, Germany’s subsistence 
allowance for the long-termed unemployed, and social allowances for beneficiaries unfit to work. 
In contrast with the Dano case, in which the EU citizen in question had never worked and was not 
seeking work, mother Alimanovic and her oldest daughter did have temporary jobs between June 2010 
and May 2011 in Germany. As a result, they received social benefits from 1 December 2011 to 31 May 
2012, after which the ‘Job Center’, the responsible German authority, withdrew their grant. 
41 This meant not following the Advocate General’s opinion. Advocate General Wathelet considered 
that it was “contrary to EU law, and more precisely, to the principle of  equal treatment affirmed in Article 18 
TFEU and clarified in Article 4 of  Regulation No 883/2004 and Article 24 of  Directive 2004/38, for the 
legislation of  a Member State, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, automatically to exclude a citizen 
of  the Union from entitlement to a special non-contributory cash benefit within the meaning of  Regulation No 
883/2004 (a benefit which, moreover, constitutes social assistance within the meaning of  Directive 2004/38) 
beyond a period of  involuntary unemployment of  six months after working for less than a year, without allowing 
that citizen to demonstrate the existence of  a genuine link with the host Member State” (v. Advocate General 
Wathelet Opinion, delivered on 26 March 2015, Alimanovic, C-67/14, 110). The Advocate General 
also stated that in circumstances such as those of  the main proceedings, the children of  a national 
of  a Member State who works or has worked in the host Member State and the parent who is their 
primary carer may claim a right of  residence there on the sole basis of  Article 10 of  Regulation 
(EU) No 492/2011 on freedom of  movement for workers within the Union, without such a right 
being conditional on their having sufficient resources and comprehensive sickness insurance cover 
in that State (v. Advocate General Wathelet Opinion, Alimanovic, C-67/14, 117-122).
42 For an analysis of  the Alimanovic case, v., v.g., A. Iliopoulou-Penot, “Deconstructing the former edifice of  
Union citizenship? The Alimanovic judgment”, Common Market Law Review (2016) 1007-1035; A.P. van 
der Mei, “Overview of  Recent Cases before the Court of  Justice of  the European Union (July-December 2015)”, 
European Journal of  Social Security, vol. 18, No. 1 (2015) 74-84.
43 In this case, as in the Dano case, the benefits at issue were characterised as ‘special non-contributory 
cash benefits’ within the meaning of  Article 70(2) of  Regulation No 883/2004, i.e. benefits which were 
intended to cover subsistence costs for persons who cannot cover them themselves and that they are 
not financed through contributions, but through tax revenue. The Court considered that, from its 
case law, those benefits were also covered by the concept of  ‘social assistance’ within the meaning of  
Article 24(2) of  Directive 2004/38, which refers to all assistance schemes established by the public 
authorities to which recourse may be had by an individual who does not have resources sufficient 
to meet his own basic needs and those of  his family and who by reason of  that fact may, during 
his period of  residence, become a burden on the public finances of  the host Member State which 
could have consequences for the overall level of  assistance which may be granted by that State. Cfr. 
Judgments Dano, of  11 November 2014, Case C 333/13, recital 63, and Alimanovic, of  15 September 
2015, Case C-67/14, recitals 43-44. 
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territory of  the host Member State complies with the conditions of  Directive 2004/38”.44 Only 
Article 7(3)(c) and Article 14(4)(b) of  the Citizens’ Directive were considered as able 
to confer a right of  residence on job-seekers in the situation of  Ms Alimanovic and 
her daughter. The first provision [Article 7(3)(c)]45 only conferred worker status during 
6 months after their last employment had ended, a period which had already expired 
when they were refused entitlement to the benefits at issue. Article 14(4)(b) can be relied 
upon to establish a right of  residence even after the expiry of  the period referred to in 
Article 7(3)(c) of  the Citizens’ Directive, entitling Ms. Alimanovic and her daughter to 
equal treatment with the nationals of  the host Member State so far as access to social 
assistance is concerned.46 However, in that case, the host Member State may rely on the 
derogation in Article 24(2) of  that Directive in order not to grant that citizen the social 
assistance sought.  
The Court went on to address the Brey case, stating that: “although the Court has 
held that Directive 2004/38 requires a Member State to take account of  the individual situation of  
the person concerned before it adopts an expulsion measure or finds that the residence of  that person 
is placing an unreasonable burden on its social assistance system (judgment in Brey, C 140/12, 
EU:C:2013:565, paragraphs 64, 69 and 78), no such individual assessment is necessary main 
proceedings (highlighted) in circumstances such as those at issue in the main proceedings”.47 The 
reasoning for this conclusion begins with stating that the Citizens’ Directive “itself  
takes into consideration various factors characterising the individual situation of  each applicant for 
social assistance and, in particular, the duration of  the exercise of  any economic activity”. Besides, 
the Directive does “guarantee a significant level of  legal certainty and transparency in the context 
of  the award of  social assistance by way of  basic provision, while complying with the principle of  
proportionality”. Finally, “while an individual claim might not place the Member State concerned 
under an unreasonable burden, the accumulation of  all the individual claims which would be submitted 
to it would be bound to do so”.48
9. Any prospect that these cases did not represent the adoption of  a broad new 
approach of  the CJEU to the question of  access to social benefits by non-national EU 
citizens was proven to be unfounded by the subsequent case that adopted the same 
methodology.
In the García-Nieto case,49 the Court once again judged on access to ‘special non-
44 Judgments Dano, of  15 September 2015, Case C 333/13, recital 69, and Alimanovic, of  15 
September 2015, Case C-67/14, recital 49. 
45 This provision provides that if  the worker is in duly recorded involuntary unemployment 
after completing a fixed-term employment contract of  less than a year or after having become 
involuntarily unemployed during the first 12 months and has registered as a jobseeker with the 
relevant employment office, he retains the status of  worker for no less than six months. During that 
period, the Union citizen concerned retains his right of  residence in the host Member State under 
Article 7 of  the Citizens’ Directive. Article 7(3)(b) provides in principle for the unlimited retention 
of  the worker status after employment for more than a year, but in that case the worker would have 
to have completed an employment contract longer than a year. 
46 Article 14(4)(b) stipulates that Union citizens who have entered the territory of  the host Member 
State in order to seek employment may not be expelled for as long as they can provide evidence that 
they are continuing to seek employment and that they have a genuine chance of  being engaged. 
47 Judgment Alimanovic, of  15 September 2015, Case C-67/14, recital 59. 
48 Judgment Alimanovic, of  15 September 2015, Case C-67/14, recitals 60-62. 
49 Judgment García-Nieto, of  25 February 2016, Case C-299/14. The unmarried Spanish couple 
García-Nieto and Peña Cuevas, had lived together in Spain for several years and had a common 
child. The father also had a son from an earlier relationship. Mother García-Nieto and their 
common child moved to Germany in April 2012, where she moved in with her mother, registered 
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contributory cash benefits’ within the meaning of  Article 70(2) of  Regulation No 883/2004, 
which also constitutes ‘social assistance’ within the meaning of  Article 24(2) of  the 
Citizens’ Directive by quoting the Dano and Alimanovic cases – “a Union citizen can claim 
equal treatment with nationals of  the host Member State (…) only if  his residence in the territory 
of  the host Member State complies with the conditions” of  the Citizens’ Directive.50 The Court 
followed the same kind of  reasoning, limiting itself  to interpreting the provisions of  
the Citizens’ Directive. While Article 6(1) of  the Citizens’ Directive provides that EU 
citizens have the right of  residence on the territory of  another Member State for a 
period of  up to three months without any conditions or any formalities other than the 
requirement to hold a valid identity card or passport, in such a case, the host Member 
State may rely on the derogation in Article 24(2) in order to refuse to grant that citizen 
the social assistance sought.51 Hence, the host Member States can exclude economically 
inactive non-national EU citizens from access to ‘social assistance’ who are residing for a 
period shorter than three months. No reference to the special status of  EU citizen or 
to the Treaties is made. No consideration is given to family status of  those involved.
The individual’s personal situation test put forward in Brey was replaced by the 
objective test used in the Alimanovic case. In Alimanovic, the Court stated that Citizens’ 
Directive, “establishing a gradual system as regards the retention of  the status of  ‘worker’ which seeks 
to safeguard the right of  residence and access to social assistance, itself  takes into consideration various 
factors characterising the individual situation of  each applicant for social assistance and, in particular, 
the duration of  the exercise of  any economic activity”.52 This reasoning is taken a step further 
by the Court in the García-Nieto case, stating that “if  such an assessment is not necessary in 
the case of  a citizen seeking employment who no longer has the status of  ‘worker’, the same applies a 
fortiori to persons who are in a situation such as that (…) in the main proceedings”.53
This delivers the coup de grace on the Brey doctrine – no individual personal situation 
test is needed; the Court merely applies the Citizens’ Directive to the case. However, 
the Court does so without the admission of  abandoning that doctrine, and without a 
specific reasoning on that subject: it is as if  the Court is presenting a mere exception.
V. Critical analysis 
10. In these decisions, the CJEU seems to have abandoned its earlier jurisprudence. 
In the pre-Dano case-law, the reasoning of  cases on Union citizenship had their 
starting point in the Treaty, bearing in mind the proportionality principle and imposed 
an individual assessment of  the person at issue. The Citizens’ Directive and other 
as a job seeker and started working in June 2012. The father and his other son joined the family 
in Germany in June 2012. Until November 2012, the family’s living expenses were met from the 
mother Garcia-Nieto’s income. From that moment onwards, the father also started to work in 
short-term jobs. The case concerned the request for social assistance benefits that the father made 
for himself  and his son in July 2012. The German authorities denied them these benefits for August 
and September as they resided shorter than three months in Germany and, during that period, were 
neither working nor self-employed. 
50 Judgment García-Nieto, of  25 February 2016, Case C-299/14, recital 38, quoting Judgments Dano, 
of  11 November 2014, Case C-333/13, recital 69, and Alimanovic, of  15 September 2015, Case 
C-67/14, recital 49. 
51 Judgment García-Nieto, of  25 February 2016, Case C-299/14, recitals 42-43, quoting Judgment 
Dano, of  11 November 2014, Case C-333/13, recital 70. 
52 Judgment García-Nieto, of  25 February 2016, Case C-299/14, recital 47, quoting Judgment 
Alimanovic, of  15 September 2015, Case C-67/14, recital 60. 
53 Judgment García-Nieto, of  25 February 2016, Case C-299/14, recital 48. 
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secondary legislation was interpreted in that light. However, in the post-Dano case-law, 
the CJEU appears not to engage in the interpretation of  the Treaty – only the letter of  
the Citizen’s Directive matter and its interpretation is done ad pedem litterae. The Dano-
Alimanovic methodology is that; “a Union citizen may claim equal treatment with nationals of  
the host Member State under Article 24(1) of  Directive 2004/38 only if  his residence in the territory 
of  that State complies with the conditions of  that directive”.54/55 Only the Directive’s provisions 
matter.
There is also an abandonment of  the Brey decision: no proportionality test or 
individual assessment of  personal circumstances was made. This is especially notable in 
the Alimanovic case, where the Court did not use the Grzelczyk characterization of  the 
European citizenship as “the fundamental status of  nationals”. It did not engage with the 
doctrine of  EU citizenship, and it made no reference to Article 20 TEU and one can 
find a bold contradiction of  the Brey test. The Court appears to have established that 
the Citizens’ Directive already creates a system of  individual assessment taking into 
consideration various factors characterising the individual situation. The Court also 
makes no mention that Ms. Alimanovic is the primary caretaker of  minor children, in 
contradiction with previous case-law.56
This approach has emerged in cases dealing with ‘special non-contributory cash 
benefits’,57 which were the benefits at issue in the Dano, Alimanovic and García-Nieto cases. 
However, it appears to be emerging as a general trend.58 In the UK child benefit or child 
tax credit case,59 despite the fact that the question is the implementation of  Regulation 
(EC) No 883/2004, and not the Citizens’ Directive, the Court quotes the Brey and the 
Dano cases to conclude that: “it is clear from the Court’s case-law that there is nothing to prevent, 
in principle, the grant of  social benefits to Union citizens who are not economically active being made 
subject to the requirement that those citizens fulfil the conditions for possessing a right to reside lawfully 
in the host Member State”.60 
11. There are positive aspects to this new line of  reasoning by the Court. The 
Dano/Alimanovic case-law represents a noteworthy shift of  emphasis, accentuating the 
protection of  Member States’ interests and a new-found respect to national legislatures.61 
Member States should be free to determine the material conditions and levels of  benefit 
54 Judgment Alimanovic, of  15 September 2015, Case C-67/14, recital 49. 
55 D. Thym, “The elusive limits of  solidarity: Residence rights of  and social benefits for economically inactive Union 
citizens”, Common Market Law Review, 52 (2015) 17-50, 25.
56 V. Judgments Ibrahim, of  23 February 2010, Case C-310/08, and Teixeira, of  23 February 2010, 
Case C-480/08. 
57 On this subject, v. T. Guerrero Padrón, “The scope and instrumentation of  the principle of  equal treatment 
regarding social assistance benefits”, e-Revista Internacional de la Protección Social, Vol. I, No. 1, (2016) 
87, 89-90. 
58 E.g., Judgment Commission v the Netherlands, of  2 June 2016, Case C-233/14, recital 82. This case 
is about the restricting of  access to fares at preferential rates on public transport for students who 
pursue their studies in the Netherlands to Netherlands students who are registered with a private 
or public educational establishment in the Netherlands and to students from other Member States 
who, in the Netherlands, are economically active or have obtained the right of  permanent residence.  
59 Judgment Commission v United Kingdom [UK child benefit or child tax credit case], of  14 June 2016, Case 
C-308/14. 
60 Judgment UK child benefit or child tax credit case, of  14 June 2016, Case C-308/14, recital 61, 68. 
However, the Brey and the Dano cases address special non-contributory benefits, whereas the social 
benefits at issue in this case (child benefit or child tax credit) are ‘social security benefits’, as referred 
to in Article 3(1)(j) of  Regulation No 883/2004, read in conjunction with Article 1(z) thereof. 
61 D. Thym, “The Elusive limits of  solidarity”… 25. 
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of  their social security systems as part of  the non-harmonisation principle.62
The Court also refuses to read the Citizens’ Directive extensively or creatively, 
respecting the will of  the EU legislature. This is extremely important: it represents the 
idea that it should be the democratically legitimised EU legislator rather than the CJEU 
to take the main responsibility in balancing the individual rights of  EU citizens against 
the financial-political interests of  the Member States to maintain social assistance 
systems.63
The new line of  reasoning also establishes clear criteria to access to benefits, 
providing legal certainty, because the Member States and the EU citizens can now trust 
that the Court will follow a literal interpretation of  the Directive instead of  performing 
an individual assessment test of  the case, whose result was considered unpredictable 
and uncertain.64
12. Despite these positive aspects, formal and substantive criticisms can be made 
of  this new trend in the CJEU case-law. 
As for the formal criticism, one can challenge the method used by the Court 
in overruling its previous judgments. Usually, this is done by means of  evolutive 
interpretation. Arguably, in this case we have an instance of  interpretation of  evolution 
which lowers rather than heightens human rights protection. Although this is not 
unprecedented in the Court’s history, one can argue that the Court needs serious 
reasons to depart from its own case-law not only in cases of  ‘progressive’ evolution but 
especially in opposite cases. On more than one occasion, the Court itself  has pointed 
out that evolutive interpretation should be justified by particularly strong reasons. 
However, the Court changed its methodology without admitting the reversal of  the 
earlier doctrine, and, once again, without a specific reasoning justifying the change.
13. Besides, the new case law states that, in terms of  access to social assistance, 
EU citizens can only claim equal treatment if  its residence in the territory of  the host 
State complies with the conditions to lawfully reside there, established in the Citizens’ 
Directive. 
This focus on the provisions of  the Citizens’ Directive means that the claim of  
equal treatment, which is established in the Treaties, is dependent on conditions set in 
secondary law. Restrictions to the right to reside established in Article 21 TFEU can 
also result from secondary legislation. In this case, fundamental freedoms, recognized 
in the Treaties, are restricted by secondary legislation and the Court does not review the 
conformity of  these restrictions with the Treaties – which are the parameters of  the 
EU’s rule of  law. The CJEU is voluntarily abdicating of  its role of  “Constitutional Court” 
of  the EU. 
14. The positive aspect of  the shift of  emphasis of  the Court with the Dano 
/ Alimanovic case-law, accentuating Member State interests, could represent, also, the 
abandonment of  countervailing constitutional arguments that could have justified a 
62 F. Pennings, “EU citizenship: access to social benefits in other EU member states”, International Journal of  
Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Relations 28 (2012), 307-334. 
63 A.P. van der Mei, “Overview of  Recent Cases before the Court of  Justice of  the European Union (July-
December 2015)”… 77.  
64 S. O’leary, “Developing an Ever Closer Union Between the Peoples of  Europe? A reappraisal of  the case-law of  
the Court of  Justice on the free movement of  persons and EU citizenship”, Yearbook of  European Law (2008) 
182. 
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different outcome.65 The idea of  solidarity between Member States and an emphatic 
defence of  the right to move and to reside, could be examples of  arguments sacrificed.
Nobody denies that the Treaties and the Citizens’ Directive trust the CJEU to 
define and control the limits of  free movement. But the Court should be careful not to 
ignore the implications for social cohesion in the internal market and the constitutional 
and sociological foundations of  social policy and the importance of  the freedom of  
movement of  citizens (independently of  being economically active or not) to the notion 
of  EU citizenship. The Court’s approach runs the risk of  downplaying the risks of  this 
reduction, in effect, of  the scope of  the freedom of  movement to encompass merely 
economically active citizens.
The assessment of  individual cases, burdensome as it was, served the wider 
objective “to ensure that the grant of  assistance (…) does not become an unreasonable burden which 
could have consequences for the overall level of  assistance”.66
15. The radical change in the CJEU case-law can be especially criticised because 
it appears to have not been needed. The Court could have used criteria established in 
earlier judgments to exclude access to benefits in these cases.67
For example, in the Dano case, Advocate General Wathelet submitted that the 
questions raised should be answered “in the light of  the principle of  proportionality” and of  
the case law of  the CJEU on the existence of  a “genuine link” between Union citizens 
and the host Member State.68 The Advocate General refers, more specifically, to the 
case-law on the grant of  assistance to students and social benefits for jobseekers, 
from which he infers that the entitlement of  economically inactive Union citizens to 
social assistance benefits “is, in general, dependent on a certain degree of  integration into the 
host Member State”.69
Also in the Dano case, the Court could have resorted to ‘the excessive burden to the 
social security system of  the host State’ criteria but, instead, chose as the reason to refuse 
access to benefits the non-fulfilment of  residence requisites established in the Citizens’ 
Directive.70
So, the CJEU could have made an evaluation of  the national legislation in light of  
the established jurisprudence, while arriving at the same conclusion (that the national 
legislation was compatible with the Treaties), but following a path which was coherent 
with its previous case-law and with less erosion of  the rights to move and to reside. 
16. Additionally, the recent case-law can also be criticised because of  the absence 
of  analysis of  the cases in light of  the EU Charter of  Fundamental Rights.
As was referred supra, the EU Charter of  Fundamental Rights was deemed non-
65 D. Thym, “The Elusive limits of  solidarity”…
66 D. Thym, “The Elusive limits of  solidarity”…, p. 32. 
67 H. Verschueren, “Preventing “benefit tourism” in the EU: A narrow or broad interpretation of  the possibilities 
offered by the ECJ in Dano?”, Common Market Law Review, vol. 52, No. 2 (2015) 363-390, 374. 
68 Advocate General Wathelet Opinion, delivered on 20 May 2014, Dano, C-333/13, recital 126. 
69 Advocate General Wathelet Opinion, delivered on 20 May 2014, Dano, C-333/13, recitals 127–
129. The Advocate General refers to this effect to the judgments Bidar, of  15 March 2005, Case 
C-209/03, recitals 56 and 57; Förster,  of  18 November 2008, Case C-158/07, recitals 48 and 49; 
Collins, of  23 March 2004, Case C-138/02, recital 67; Vatsouras, of  4 June 2009, Case C-22/08 and 
C-23/08,  recital 38; Prinz and Seeberger, of  18 July 2013, Cases C-523/11 and C-585/11, recital 36; 
and Thiele Meneses, of  24 October 2013, Case C-220/12, recital 35. 
70 P. Jimenez Blanco, “Derecho de residencia en la Unión Europea y turismo social”, La Ley Unión 
Europea, No. 22 (2015) 11. 
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applicable in the Dano case. In fact, despite the clear statement, in the Åkerberg Fransson 
case, that the Charter was applicable in all situations governed by European Union 
law,71 in the social rights arena, this clarity of  purpose has eluded the Court.72/73
Also, the connection between fundamental rights and EU citizenship, established 
in decisions such as the Rottmann74 or the Ruiz Zambrano75 cases, has been read in a 
much more restrictive manner in the Cholakova76 or Ymeraga77 cases.78 The convergence 
of  these tendencies with the Dano case-law results in a deficit of  protection of  non-
economically active Union citizens who seek access to social benefits.  
17. The CJEU’s judgements in Dano and Alimanovic introduced a level of  ambiguity 
on the EU citizens’ right to free movement and freedom to reside in the territory of  
any EU Member State. 
The right of  a EU citizen to reside in a Member State other than its national State 
is made dependent on he/she’s ability to support themselves and their family in order 
to avoid becoming an unreasonable burden on the social security system of  the host 
State. There is an implied duty to have sufficient resources and the economically inactive 
citizens can apparently see their right of  movement restricted. In fact, the only relevant 
circumstance after Alimanovic is the duration of  economic activity – not the existence of  
genuine link to the Member State or the family status. EU citizenship is, therefore, once 
again related with worker status and the content of  the EU citizenship as a fundamental 
and political status with no link with market economy, is being dismantled.
The Dano and Alimanovic cases can be seen as confirming as the Court now takes 
a back seat when it comes to protecting the legal status of  economically inactive EU 
citizens.79 The Court’s analysis of  the meaning of  the Citizens’ Directive could be 
interpreted to the effect that Member States are allowed to refuse to pay any social 
benefits, including social security benefits, to economically inactive Union citizens who 
do not have the right to reside under that Directive, namely because they do not possess 
sufficient resources of  their own.80 It is up to the EU legislator, through the Citizens’ 
Directive, to define the legal status of  EU citizens. The CJEU no longer refers to EU 
citizenship as the ‘fundamental status’ of  citizens and seems no longer willing to use the 
TFEU’s provisions on EU citizenship and the rights attached to it to interpret the 
Directive. 
71 Judgment Åkerberg Fransson, of  26 February 2013, Case C-617/10, recital 19. 
72 V., v.g., Judgments Torralbo Marcos, of  27 March 2014, Case C-265/13, recitals 29-30 and 43; Julian 
Hernández, of  10 July 2014, Case C-198/13, recitals 32-34, 37, and 48; Ariza Toledano, of  5 February 
2015, Case C-117/14, recitals 28-29, and 42. In all these cases the Charter was considered not 
applicable. 
73 For an analisys of  the more recent decisions, v. F. Fontanelli, “The implementation of  European Union 
law by Member States under Article 51(1) of  the Charter of  Fundamental Rights”, The Columbia Journal of  
European Law, vol. 20, No. 3 (2014) 193-247; J. Genberg, “The scope of  application of  the Charter of  
Fundamental Rights of  the European Union: quo vadimus?”, Helsinki Law Review, vol. 8, No. 1 (2014) 31-60. 
74 Judgment Rottman, of  2 March 2010, Case C-135/08. 
75 Judgment Ruiz Zambrano, of  8 March 2011, Case C-34/09. 
76 Order of  the Court of  6 June 2013, Cholakova, C-14/13, recitals 28-29, 31. 
77 Judgment Ymeraga, of  8 May 2013, Case C-87/12, recitals 40 and 43. 
78 S. Iglesias Sánchez, “Fundamental Rights and Citizenship of  the Union at a Crossroads. A Promising Alliance 
or a Dangerous Liason”, European Law Journal, vol. 20, No. 4 (2014) 466-467. 
79 A.P. van der Mei, “Overview of  Recent Cases before the Court of  Justice of  the European Union (July-
December 2015)”..., p. 77. 
80 H. Verschueren, “Preventing ‘Benefit Tourism’ in the EU: A Narrow or Broad Interpretation of  the 
Possibilities offered by the ECJ in Dano?”… 378-379. 
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One may agree with the need to respect the will of  the democratically legitimised 
legislator (national and European). However, if  the EU is governed by the rule of  law, 
it should be up to its highest Court to control the decisions of  the legislatures, especially 
in times of  socio-economic crises. The Citizens’ Directive cannot be seen as giving the 
Member States carte blanche to discriminate between EU citizens.
18. Several questions remain. 
What motivated this change? Is the CJEU being influenced by the political 
debates in the Member States on “social tourism”? Or is the Dano/Alimanovic case law 
driven by the view that the previous EU citizenship case law is now seen as having been 
too judicially activist?81 How far will the Court go? What is, then, left of  the previous 
jurisprudence on this matter?
If, in terms of  access to social assistance, EU citizens can only claim equal 
treatment if  its residence in the territory of  the host State complies with the conditions 
to lawfully reside there, established in the Citizens’ Directive, what happens to those 
EU citizens whose right to reside in the host Member State are based on other EU 
instruments, such as Article 45 TFEU as in the Saint-Prix case,82 or on national law 
which is more favourable than the Directive (as in the Martinez Sala and Trojani cases)?
As Advocate General Wathelet pointed out, it is likely that the residence of  the 
non-national EU citizens will be jeopardised in the event of  being excluded from 
entitlement to subsistence benefits.83 Without sufficient means of  subsistence, the 
Union citizens could be considered “illegal”, which means that a consequence of  the 
Dano jurisprudence is to allow for EU citizens to be classified as “illegal migrants”84. Can 
they be expelled?
Is a right of  Member States to discriminate economically inactive citizens being 
recognized? A kind of  licence to discriminate unwritten in the Treaties, but established 
in a Directive? Can be used to such an end?
One can accept that there are financial reasons shared and approved by all 
Member States, which justify restrictions to the principle of  equal treatment in regard 
to the granting of  social assistance benefits to non-nationals residing in the territory of  
the host State. However, one cannot forget that, from the point of  view of  adversely 
affected citizens, this means that the free movement of  citizens and workers in the 
European Union is still incomplete.
81 A.P. van der Mei, “Overview of  Recent Cases before the Court of  Justice of  the European Union 
(July-December 2015)”… 77. 
82 Judgment Saint Prix, of  19 June 2014, Case C-507/12. 
83 Advocate General Wathelet Opinion, delivered on 20 May 2014, Dano, C-333/13, recital 125. 
84 D. Thym, “The Elusive limits of  solidarity”… 45. 
